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TEXT OF AUTHORITIES
1.

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-97 (1990):

(1) Any employee sustaining an injury arising out of and in
the course of employment shall provide notification to his
employer promptly of the injury. If the employee is unable
to provide notification, the employee's next-of-kin or
attorney may provide notification of the injury to the
employer.
(2) Any employee who fails to notify his employer or the
Commission within 180 days of the injury is barred for any
claim of benefits arising from the injury.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a) (1994).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Was it proper for the Board of Review to determine that
Jacobsen's "work activity" supported the legal cause of her
injuries after inventing its own notion sua sponte of what her
"work activity" was?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Board's application of Allen v. Industrial Com'n.. 729
P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), to the facts of this case is a mixed
question of law and fact subject to intermediate "reasonable and
rational" review.

Sisco Hilte v. Industrial Com'n. of Utah, 766

P.2d 1089 (Utah App. 1988).
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PRESERVATION OF ISSUE AT ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL
The issue was raised at R. 68-71.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The applicant, Jessica D. Jacobsen, worked as a waitress for
the petitioner Hilton Hotel from January 16 to August 1992.
(Hilton Hotel and Pacific Reliance Insurance will be collectively
referred to as "Hilton"). (R. 2-3, 61-2) (A copy of the Findings
of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Order is attached as
"Addendum A " ) .

She was a part-time employee.

(R. 1-3).

Before working at Hilton, Jacobsen had a pre-existing
history of medical problems with her neck and cervical spine. (R.
78-9) (A copy of the Order on Motion for Review is attached as
"Addendum B " ) .

She was involved in a gymnastics accident while

she was a teenager, resulting in a head injury and broken arms.
(R. 157).

In 1971 she was diagnosed as having a congenital

unstable back. (R. 215). She sustained a neck injury in 1982
from an automobile accident.

(R. 158). The next year she was

diagnosed with degenerative disc disease.

(R. 216).

Little more than a week before she began working at Hilton,
on January 6, 1992, Jacobsen visited her chiropractor, Dr. Van
Slooten. (R. 216, 438) .

She complained of back pain, numbness in

her limbs and fingertips, and a popping sensation in her back.
(R. 216, 438).
On May 6, 1992, Jacobsen was lifting a tray from the service
counter at Hilton when she experienced neck and back pain, a
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clawing sensation in her hand, and a popping sensation in her
back.1

(R. 63, 78, 210). She lifted the tray properly and

lifted it about a foot and a half upwards. (R. 64). Jacobsen
changed her estimate of the tray's weight at various times during
her pursuit of benefits, guessing that it weighed anywhere from
thirty to fifty-five pounds (R. 118, 243). However, Jacobsen's
supervisor, Susie Buecher, witnessed the May 6 incident and
observed the tray Jacobsen was carrying.

(R. 190). Ms. Buecher

then weighed a comparable tray of food and found it to weigh 16.5
pounds.

(R. 195-6).

Jacobsen went to Workcare the next day, where two treating
physicians diagnosed her problem as degenerative disc disease.
(R. 147). She sought another opinion from Dr. Craig McQueen, who
agreed with the diagnosis and placed her in physical therapy
until July 15, 1992, when she returned to work.

(R. 61, 147-8).

Claiming that she was unable to perform her work, Jacobsen
left employment with Hilton permanently on August 29, 1992.
(R. 62-3).

She applied for workers' compensation benefits, which

Hilton denied.

Jacobsen then commenced this proceeding with the

Industrial Commission, describing her "accident" as lifting the
tray on May 6.

(R. 1). She later affirmed this description of

Jacobsen claims that she also felt back pain on April 19,
1992, as she was lifting a tub of dishes at work. (R. 61).
Nevertheless, Jacobsen did not report this alleged incident to
her employer as required by Utah Code Ann. §35-1-97. (R. 61, 62,
118). This alleged incident therefore cannot be considered in
Jacobsen's claim for benefits.
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her accident in her Memorandum in Opposition to Hilton's Motion
for Review. (R. 76).
Hilton argued at the hearing before the Administrative Law
Judge ("ALJ") that Jacobsen's pre-existing condition contributed2
to her May 6 injury, warranting the application of the higher
causation standard in Allen v. Industrial Comm'n., 729 P.2d 15
(Utah 1986).3

(R. 198-9).

The Administrative Law Judge declined

to apply the Allen standard and awarded Jacobsen benefits.
(R. 60-7).
Upon Hilton's Motion for Review, the Board of Review found
that Hilton had shown that Jacobsen's pre-existing conditions did
contribute to her workplace injury.4

(R. 78-9).

Thus, the Board

2

Hilton also produced evidence that Jacobsen's pre-existing
conditions constituted the sole cause of her permanent
impairment, relying on an independent medical examination of
Jacobsen performed by Dr. Louis Schricker in 1993. (R. 210).
Dr. Schricker noted that Jacobsen's work activity only aggravated
her pre-existing conditions temporarily and did not cause any
permanent impairment. (R. 217-8).
3

Jacobsen argued that her injury on May 6 was caused by her
work and not by any pre-existing condition. In support of this
argument, Jacobsen introduced a letter written to her attorney by
Dr. Reichert, who examined her in 1993 for the purpose of
obtaining an impairment rating. (R. 114, 154, 208-9) . Dr.
Reichert states without explanation in his letter that "the cause
of the patient's current symptamology is lifting injury from 7
May 1992." (R. 208). Dr. Reichert's letter does not mention
that he considered or had access to Jacobsen's prior medical
history (R. 2 08), and Jacobsen is unsure whether Dr. Reichert
knew of her prior medical history. (R. 155-7).
4

Hilton produced a supplemental medical report from Dr.
Louis Schricker stating that Jacobsen's pre-existing conditions
were the major cause of her temporary incapacity on May 6.
(R. 72-3) .
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determined that the Allen case test does apply and that Jacobsen
has the burden of proving that her work activity constituted both
the legal and medical cause of her injury.

(R. 78-9) .

However, rather than addressing whether the May 6 incident
of lifting the tray amounted to unusual stress or trauma so as to
constitute the legal cause of her injury, the Board of Review
ignored the May 6 incident that had previously been the focus of
the case.

Instead the Board injected a new theory into the case,

one which had never before mentioned by the parties or examining
physicians: that Jacobsen's actual "accident" was her "cumulative
work-related exertion."

(R. 79). Specifically, the Board

declared that Jacobsen's "repetitious lifting of loaded serving
trays" constituted exertion beyond that experienced in life's
usual activities and thus supported the legal cause of her
injury.

(R. 79). The Board then affirmed the ALJ's award of

benefits based on the Board's own conclusion that Jacobsen had
satisfied the Allen requirement of legal causation.

(R. 79).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Board of Review cannot affirm an award of workmens'
compensation benefits based upon a theory never raised by the
parties, never presented as evidence and never suggested by
examining physicians.

Yet the Board did precisely that by

concocting the sua sponte notion that Jacobsen suffered from
cumulative work-related exertion and then declaring that it
supports the legal cause of her injury.
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Jacobsen still has not

met her burden of proving that her work activity legally caused
her injuries, despite the Board's attempt to invent a favorable
theory of legal causation for her.

This Court should therefore

reverse the Board's decision awarding Jacobsen benefits.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE BOARD IMPROPERLY DETERMINED
THE ISSUE OF LEGAL CAUSE BY BASING
ITS DETERMINATION UPON A SUA SPONTE NOTION
A. The Allen Test Applies In This Case To Require Proof
That Jacobsen's Work Activity Legally Caused Her Injury.
An injury occurring during working hours is only compensable
if the employee can prove that work-related exertion or trauma
contributed to or caused the injury.
729 P.2d 15, 24 (Utah 1986).

Allen v. Industrial Com'n.,

When an employee brings a pre-

existing condition to the workplace, as Jacobsen did, she must
meet a two-part test under Allen to prove that the work caused
her injury.

Allen, 729 P.2d at 25-7. The second part of this

test, medical cause, is not contested in this appeal and thus
will not be discussed.
The first part of the Allen causation test compels an
applicant to show that her work activity constituted the legal
cause of her injury.

Initially, the "work activity" of the

employee must be delineated.

Next, the agency must decide

whether that activity amounted to unusual, extraordinary exertion
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when compared to nonemployment life.

Price River Coal Co. v.

Industrial Com'n., 731 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Utah 1986).
The Board correctly concluded that the Allen test applies to
Jacobsen's claim since her pre-existing condition contributed to
her injury.

However, it acted improperly by ignoring the

parties' impression of what Jacobsen's work activity was and
substituting its own notion of cumulative trauma.
B. The Board Improperly Attempted To Meet This Higher
Causation Standard For Jacobsen By Fashioning Its Own Idea Of
What Her Work Activity Was.
1. THE CUMULATIVE TRAUMA NOTION WAS NEVER MENTIONED IN THIS
CLAIM UNTIL THE BOARD CHOSE TO BASE ITS JUDGMENT UPON IT.
Addressing the first portion of the legal cause requirement,
designating the work activity, the Board announced that the
repetitive lifting of serving trays constituted her work
activity.

The Board thus injected into Jacobsen's claim for the

first time the suggestion that cumulative activity of her job
effectively became her accident.
Neither Jacobsen nor Hilton took the position at any time
during the pendency of her claim before the Commission that
repetitive lifting contributed to or caused her injuries.
notion was never pled nor otherwise asserted.

Such a

It was never

addressed at the hearing before the ALJ nor was any evidence
presented to support or refute it. Jacobsen first described her
accident in her Application for Hearing as the lifting of the
tray on May 6; she stuck to this description throughout the
proceedings, including in her Opposition to Hilton's Motion for
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Review.

Her counsel did not suggest at the hearing before the

ALJ that she was proceeding on a theory of repetitive lifting; he
instead argued that there was no evidence of a pre-existing
physical condition, that lifting a tray was unusual compared to
nonemployment activity, and that her injury aggravated preexisting psychological problems.

(R. 203-5).

Accordingly, the

ALJ delineated Jacobsen's accident as her lifting of the tray on
May 6, not as the repetitive lifting of trays over time.

(R. 45-

6) .
Since the parties never contended that repetitive lifting
caused Jacobsen's injuries, it is not surprising that the
evidence before the ALJ and the Board did not present a case of
cumulative trauma.

There is no evidence of how many times she

lifted trays during her employment at Hilton, how much each tray
weighed, or how many times she lifted a tray each night.

There

is no evidence of how much of her employment duty each night was
devoted to tray lifting, whether co-employees helped her carry
trays to tables, or how long she held a tray above her shoulder
on average while transporting it to a table.

Rather than dealing

with a complete description of all her nightly employment duties
over time, Jacobsen's direct and cross examination focused on her
May 6 lifting incident (R. 118-9, 139-143), and culminated with
her admission on cross examination that she originally sustained
her injury on May 6.

(R. 136) .
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Additionally, none of her several examining physicians ever
mentioned that her injuries might be traceable to repetitive
lifting of trays. Dr. Schricker focuses on her May 6 injury when
stating that her work activities only caused temporary
aggravation of her pre-existing condition (R. 217-8), while Dr.
Reichert contends that the cause "of the patient's current
symptomatology is lifting injury from 7 May 1992."

(R. 208).

The medical panel that examined her after the hearing also did
not suggest that she might have suffered from cumulative trauma
of lifting trays repetitively.

(R. 48-59) .

Despite the parties' focus on the May 6 lifting and the lack
of any insinuation in the evidence that Jacobsen's injuries were
traceable to cumulative trauma, the Board nonetheless changed
Jacobsen's work activity to "the repetitious lifting of loaded
serving trays."5

(R. 79). It offered no supportive facts for

5

A possible explanation for the Board's insistence upon
introducing a theory of cumulative trauma despite lack of
supporting evidence is that it thought it was required to
consider cumulative trauma as a matter of course in every
worker's compensation case involving the Allen test. The Board
quotes Nyrehn v. Industrial Comm'n., 800 P.2d 330 (Utah 1990),
out of context, for the proposition that Jacobsen had to
demonstrate that her cumulative work-related exertion exceeds
normal nonemployment exertion. (R. 79). In Nyrehn, the parties
had actually broached and debated the issue of cumulative trauma,
and there was evidence of cumulative trauma to the employee
involved. Nyrehn. 800 P.2d at 331. While cumulative trauma was
therefore a relevant legal issue for the Nyrehn court to
contemplate, Nyrehn does not instruct that cumulative trauma is a
consideration to be thrown perfunctorily into every workers'
compensation case that happens to deal with Allen causation.
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this new inference, leaving it unclear what evidence, if any, the
Board relied upon to support its cumulative trauma notion.6
2.

THE BOARD'S SUA SPONTE IDEA OF CUMULATIVE TRAUMA
IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE AWARD OF BENEFITS.

The Board hinged its judgment upon a notion that was never
raised by the parties or suggested by the evidence.

Adjudicative

bodies must be responsive to the issues as framed by parties when
rendering judgments because they lack authority to render a
decision on issues not presented for determination.

Combe v.

Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1984).
This Court recently extended the limitation on sua sponte
decision making to administrative tribunals in Chevron U.S.A. v.
State Tax Com'n. . 847 P.2d 418 (Utah 1993) .7 The petitioners in
Chevron were notified by the Property Tax Division of the
Commission that taxes on their refineries would be centrally

6

Hilton disputes the Board's unsupported inference of
cumulative trauma. To the extent that this inference is arguably
factual as opposed to a mixed inference of law and fact, Hilton
ostensibly has a duty to marshal the evidence in support of
cumulative trauma. Nonetheless, when an agency fails to disclose
the evidence or logic it might have employed in making a factual
finding, marshalling the evidence is impossible. See Woodward v.
Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991) (findings must include
enough subsidiary facts to show clearly the evidence upon which
they are grounded or the marshalling effort is futile); Adams v.
Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n.. 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991)
(factual findings should be sufficiently detailed to disclose the
steps by which ultimate factual conclusions are reached; absent
this, appellant wishing to challenge agency's factual findings
cannot marshal evidence).
7

This Court again cautioned administrative tribunals against
taking sua sponte action in dicta in Middlestadt v. Industrial
Com'n.. 852 P.2d 1012, 1013 n.2 (Utah App. 1993).
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assessed by the state.

They initiated formal adjudicative

proceedings with the Commission, which held that the taxes should
be centrally assessed pursuant to subsection (a) of a particular
statute in Utah's Property Tax Act. Although the parties had
raised and debated whether subsection (d) of that statute could
apply to require central assessment, subsection (a) was never
mentioned as a ground for central assessment until the Commission
relied upon it in its final decision.

This Court noted that the

subject matter of subsection (a) arose only as part of the
parties' presentation of evidence before the Commission and was
never directly discussed as authority for central assessment.
Id. at 421. Because the Commission sua sponte raised and decided
an issue that had not been raised by the parties, this Court
reversed the Commission's decision.

Id. at 420-1.

As this Court

observed,
[p]reservation of the integrity of the adversarial system of
conducting trials precludes the court from infringing upon
counsel's role of advocacy. Counsel is entitled to control
the presentation of evidence, and should there be a failure
to present evidence on a claim at issue, it is generally
viewed as a waiver.
[T]he interests of justice are not enhanced when the court
exceeds its role as arbiter by reaching out and deciding an
issue that would otherwise be dead, it not having been
litigated at the time of trial.
Id. at 421, quoting Girard v. Appleby. 660 P.2d 245 (Utah
1983) .
This Court also faulted the Commission for merely concluding that
subsection (a) applied without developing subsidiary facts
supporting the application.

Id. at 421 n.9.

-11-

The same problems with sua sponte decision making detailed
in Chevron arise here due to the Board's creation of the
cumulative trauma theory.

First, the Board placed itself in the

improper role of advocate for Jacobsen by devising a theory of
recovery that she could have raised but did not.

Second, because

it announced the cumulative trauma theory for the first time on
final agency judgment, Hilton was deprived of the right to
compile legal authority countering the theory or to present
testimony against it at the hearing before the ALJ.

Hilton could

not rebut the notion that repetitive lifting caused Jacobsen's
injuries because the Board's unprecedented action foreclosed
debate.
The third flaw in deciding Jacobsen's claim based on a
theory that the parties did not raise is that the Board's theory
lacks substantial evidence.

The Board simply states without

explanation in its Order that repetitive lifting of trays caused
Jacobsen's injuries and that cumulative trauma existed in her
case.

It did not, as it could not, offer medical evidence to

support this notion; none of her examining physicians, including
those on the medical panel, attributed her injuries to
progressive work-related trauma.

The Board did not, as it could

not, offer testimonial evidence, because cumulative trauma was
never an issue at the hearing before Judge Allen.

Lacking any

proof, the Board did not enter subsidiary factual findings to
bolster, much less explain, its bare announcement that repetitive
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lifting caused her injuries.

In a similar case, Price River Coal

Co, v. Industrial Com'n., 731 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1986), the
Industrial Commission had ruled that a worker's employment
activities amounted to unusual exertion and caused his death, but
failed to explain what those employment activities were.

The

Supreme Court reversed the agency's ruling, noting that
the "finding" of unusual exertion and stress is nothing more
than a conclusion.... We cannot affirm such a mixed
conclusion of fact and law when its necessary premises are
not evident.
Price River Coal, 731 P.2d at 1083.
Likewise, this Court should reverse the Board's award of
benefits in this case because the basis for its judgment lacks
substantial evidence.

Grace Drilling Co. V. Board of Review, 776

P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989) (substantial evidence standard
requires agency to support findings with more than scintilla of
evidence).
C. Even If The Board's Sua Sponte Action Was Proper, This
Court Can Conclude That Repetitive Lifting Of Trays Is Not
Extraordinarily Stressful.
After improperly defining what Jacobsen's work activity was,
the Board completed the legal cause inquiry by stating that
repetitive lifting constitutes unusual and extraordinary
activity.

This Court is free to reach the opposite conclusion

that this does not constitute unusual and extraordinary activity;
the Board's determination that a work activity exceeds demands in
nonemployment life is accorded no particular deference.

Nyrehn

v. Industrial Com'n. of Utah, 800 P.2d 330, 333 n.5 (Utah App.
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1990) . Thus, even if this Court concludes that the Board was
justified in inventing the cumulative trauma theory, it can still
reverse the Board's decision if it feels that lifting trays is
not extraordinarily demanding.
The Board inappropriately determined that Jacobsen had met
her burden of showing her work activity legally caused her injury
as required under Allen.

It exceeded its authority in fashioning

a sua sponte "work activity" that lacks evidentiary support in
the record.

Since Jacobsen has not demonstrated that her work

activity constituted the legal cause of her injury, reversal of
the award of benefits is warranted.
POINT II
JACOBSEN'S WORK ACTIVITY
AS DEFINED BY THE PARTIES DID
NOT CONSTITUTE THE LEGAL CAUSE
OF HER INJURIES.
The parties defined the work activity that allegedly caused
Jacobsen's injury as the lifting of the tray on May 6.

It is

undisputed that Jacobsen lifted the tray in the correct manner
and that she lifted the tray about one and a half feet to her
shoulder.

The parties disputed the weight of the tray; the ALJ

did not enter a finding as to the weight of the tray, but noted
that Jacobsen testified it weighed thirty pounds while Hilton
maintained it weighed 16.5 pounds. (R. 62).

-14-

Given these facts, Jacobsen's lifting of the tray on May 6
was not extraordinarily stressful under the Allen test.8 The
Utah Supreme Court in Allen listed several examples of typical
nonemployment activities to gauge whether a given employment
activity is unusual.

Included in these examples were lifting and

carrying baggage for travel and lifting a small child to chest
height.

Allen, 729 P.2d at 26.

The Court went on to quote with

favor a well-known workers' compensation treatise stating that
lifting twenty-pound objects such as bags of golf clubs was not
unusual or extraordinary.

Id. at 26 n.8, quoting Larson,

Workmen's Compensation §38.83 at 7-280-81.

Considering the

Supreme Court's broad position in Allen on how much an individual
normally lifts in nonemployment life, the tray Jacobsen lifted on
May 6 was not extraordinarily heavy and could not have legally
cause of her neck injury.
Despite the Board's inappropriate handling of the legal
cause issue in this claim, this Court has authority to determine
the legal cause issue properly.

Jacobsen's actual work activity

did not legally cause her injury as required under Allen,
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED
Jacobsen has failed to meet her burden of showing that her
work activity constituted the legal cause of her neck injury.
8

Although neither the ALJ nor the Board determined whether
lifting a tray weighing 16.5 to thirty pounds constitutes
extraordinary activity, this Court can evaluate that question.
Nyrehn, 800 P.2d at 333, n.5.
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The Board's attempt to create a favorable "work activity" for her
is a nullity; it invented that work activity in disregard of the
parties' consistent position and in disregard of the evidence
before it.

Since Jacobsen's lifting of a tray on May 6 was not

extraordinarily stressful, her work activity did not constitute
the legal cause of her injury.

Based upon the foregoing, Hilton

respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Board's award
of benefits to Jacobsen.
DATED t h i s 3>c^

d a y of

CTc^oiorii

/ 1995.

SNOW# CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

P. Q n ^
By.
Stiuart L. Poelman
Julianne P. Blanch
Attorneys for Petitioner

kl
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 3d
day of January, 1995.
M. David Eckersley, Esq.
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler
City Centre I, Suite 900
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ADDENDUM A:
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

_c?^2.L
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 92-817

JESSICA D. JACOBSEN,

*
*

Applicant,

*
*

VS.
HILTON HOTEL and/or UNITED
PACIFIC RELIANCE INSURANCE,

*
*
*
*

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

*

Defendants.

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East Third South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on
August 20, 1993, at 8:30 o'clock a.m., the same
being pursuant to Order and Notice of the
Commission.

BEFORE:

Timothy
Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and represented by M.
David Eckersley, Attorney at Law.

C. Allen, Presiding Administrative Law

The defendants were represented
Poelman, Attorney at Law.

by

Stuart

L.

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing in this
matter, the case was referred to a Medical Panel appointed by the
Administrative Law Judge. The Medical Panel Report was received
and copies were distributed to the parties by registered mail.
Fifteen (15) days having elapsed since the mailing of said Panel
Report, and no objections having been received thereto; the Medical
Panel Report is hereby admitted into evidence.
Being fully advised in the premises, the Administrative Law
Judge is prepared to enter the following,
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FINDINGS OF FACT:
The applicant herein, Jessica D. Jacobsen, started working for
the Salt Lake Hilton Hotel in January of 1992, as a cocktail
waitress. The applicant worked at the Room At The Top restaurant.
On April 19, 1992, the applicant contends that she was lifting a
heavy tub of dishes into the kitchen, when she experienced mid-back
pain, and pain between her shoulder blades accompanied with spasm.
The applicant apparently did not report that injury to anyone and
continued working.
On May 6, 1992, the applicant was in the process of lifting an
oval food service tray from the service counter, when she
experienced clawing in her left hand and neck pain. The applicant
had described the tray as weighing thirty pounds, however, the
applicant7s immediate supervisor testified that the service tray
with four meals on it would have weighed 16.5 pounds, including the
tray.
At the time of her injury, the applicant's immediate
supervisor was approximately two or three feet away, and noticed
that the applicant had to let the tray back down to the service
counter.
The applicant called out to her supervisor for
assistance, and informed her that "I can't feel my arm."
The
applicant started having neck pain, and could hardly move her head.
An accident report was filled out by the supervisor, and an
incident report was filled out by the applicant.
On May 7, 1992, the applicant was sent to WorkCare by her
employer, and, at that facility, it was recommended that she have
6 - 8 weeks of physical therapy. The applicant wanted a second
opinion, so she contacted her employer and informed them that she
would be seeking additional medical opinion. The applicant having
previously been treated by Dr. Craig McQueen, reported to Dr.
McQueen on May 12, 1992. Dr. McQueen had previously performed knee
surgery on the applicant, and after examining the applicant, Dr.
McQueen concurred with the recommendation of physical therapy.
The applicant received physical therapy, and was eventually
released from that care. The applicant returned to work on or
about July 15, 1992, and testified that she was fine at first.
However, by mid-August, her symptoms had returned, especially
following the lifting that was required by her job. The applicant
was unable to function at full capacity. On or about August 20,
1992, she and her immediate supervisor discussed the problems the
applicant was having doing her job, and, at that time, it was
requested that the applicant resign, since she was unable to
perform her duties due to the physical problems it was causing her.
The applicant requested some additional time, so that she could get
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her personal affairs organized. The applicant also testified that
no light duty was offered to her and also that there is no light
duty work that can be performed by a waitress. The applicant last
worked on August 29, 1992.
On September 25, 1992, Dr. McQueen gave the applicant a 5%
permanent partial impairment as the result of her industrial
injury. In October of 1989, the applicant was seen by Dr. Gant for
a psychological evaluation at the request of the Division of
Rehabilitation Services.
The applicant received chiropractic treatment from Dr. Van
Slooten following her injury of May 6, 1992, but those treatments
were discontinued after the physical therapist that the applicant
was receiving treatment from advised her that she should
discontinue forceful chiropractic manipulations.
The physical
therapist advised the applicant that she needed nonforceful
treatment. The applicant changed her chiropractic care to Dr. Troy
Giles, and he treated her with spinal touch trigger point therapy,
and other treatment modalities of a nonforceful nature.
Dr. Giles then referred the applicant on to Dr. Reichert for
neurological care, after the applicant was complaining of tingling
in her upper extremities following her chiropractic adjustments.
Dr. Reichert had the applicant receive an MRI and a CT scan, and
gave the applicant a 20% whole person rating.
In January of 1993, the applicant started massage therapy
school, but later had to discontinue that program when she was
informed that she had a carcinoma of her cervix and uterus. The
applicant resumed that school program the first part of July of
1993.
The applicant7s present complaints are that she has numbness
in her hands and problems with her grip, which is exacerbated when
she gardens, sews, or does any lifting. She also complains of
decreased range of motion in her neck and neck pain.
In 1982, the applicant was involved in a car accident in
Pennsylvania. A month or so afterwards, the applicant experienced
the inability to move her neck, and so she reported to Dr.
Soderberg, who informed her that it was not uncommon for a whiplash
injury to become symptomatic a month later. Dr. Soderberg treated
her conservatively, and the applicant testified that she had no
further problems with her neck until January 1992. At that time,
the applicant testified that she fell while skiing, and had
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tingling in her hands for one or two days, and then had problems
with the paraspinous muscles of her mid and low back.
She
testified that that she treated with Dr. Van Slooten one or two
times weekly as part of a maintenance program.
On cross-examination, the applicant testified that in January
of 1993, she had the first of four surgical procedures on her
carcinoma. The applicant testified further regarding the events of
May 6, 1992.
She testified that she had to lift the tray
approximately 1-1% feet off the service station onto her left
shoulder. She stated that as she did so, she felt a pain in her
neck and a clawing in her left hand, which caused her to drop the
tray onto the station. The applicant also stated that she was
leaning over as she lifted the tray. She stated that she had no
had no prior problems similar to this in her neck.
At age fourteen, the applicant sustained a head injury while
engaged in gymnastics. The applicant was attempting a triple flip
off the parallel bars, when she missed, and as a result fractured
both of her arms and had a concussion. The applicant reiterated
that following the ski accident in January of 1992, she had
tingling of her fingers for a couple of days. She also testified
that she saw Dr. Van Slooten on May 5, 1992, for an adjustment of
her back.
The Human Resource Director of the Hilton Hotel was called and
testified that the applicant did not report any industrial injury
to her on April 9, or April 19, or August 20, 1992. She testified
that the applicant informed her that she was terminating her
employment because she was unable to perform her work.
The applicant's immediate supervisor was called and testified
that she witnessed the applicant's injury, and that the applicant
lifted correctly and routinely.
She also testified that the
applicant was having problems and treatment for her back, starting
with the first day she started at the Hilton Hotel. She also
testified that the applicant reported no injuries to her on April
9, or April 19, 1992.
She also testified that there was no
accident on August 20, 1992, but rather, that she and the applicant
sat and talked about the fact that lifting the trays was
detrimental to the applicant and that it was hurting her
physically.

JESSICA JACOBSEN
ORDER
PAGE FIVE

The applicant's immediate supervisor also testified credibly that
the applicant did not miss any work before May 6, 1992, due to her
back.
She also testified forthrightly that she observed no
limitations on the part of the applicant as far as doing her job
before May 6, 1992.
Based on the foregoing, I find that the applicant was not
suffering from pre-existing problems with her neck or clawing of
her left hand prior to May 6, 1992. However, the evidence does
support a finding that she was having difficulties with her low
back. The Nyrehn case requires that: " An employer must prove
medically that the claimant 'suffers from a preexisting condition
which contributes to the injury.' (Note omitted) In this case I
have been directed to no evidence, by the defendants, upon which
"the critical factual finding that [Jacobsen's] preexisting
condition contributed to her injury." Accordingly, with respect to
the neck injury of May 6, 1992 the higher legal causation standard
of Allen does not apply. Therefore, the applicant is entitled to
a finding that she sustained a compensable industrial accident on
May 6, 1992.
The defendants referred the applicant to Dr. Schricker, for an
independent medical examination.
Dr. Schricker found that the
applicant's work activities of May 1992, resulted "In an
aggravation of her well documented pre-existing condition of osteoarthritis." Dr. Schricker went on to find that the applicant was
temporarily disabled as the result of those activities for
approximately ten weeks or until July 16, 1992. Dr. Schricker gave
the applicant a 5% permanent partial impairment rating due to the
osteoarthritis, and it would appear that the doctor also found that
1% of that 5% impairment would be due to the industrial events,
although the report is not clear.
Because of the disputed medical issues, the case was referred
to the Medical Panel for its evaluation. The Medical Panel found
that the applicant was temporarily totally disabled from the
industrial accident of-.May 6, 1992 until July 15, 1992. The Panel
also concluded that the applicant has a 2% permanent impairment due
to the accident of May 6, 1992, and that the accident did not
result in any aggravation of the applicant's pre-existing
psychiatric condition. Having reviewed all of the evidence oon the
file, I find that the Panel's findings are well supported by the
evidence, and I adopts the Panel's findings as my own.
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On May 6, 1992 the applicant was single and was earning $2.13
per hour plus tips.
The payroll records indicate that the
applicant was paid wages based on hours worked and tips earned.
Usually, Section 75 of the Act requires that the average weekly
wage be based on the number of hours worked by an employee per
week. However, in this case because of the payment of tip income,
it seems more appropriate to utilize the following provision:
35-1-75. Average weekly wage - Basis of computation.
* * *

(g) (i) If at the time of the injury the wages are fixed
by the output of the employee, the average weekly wage
shall be the wage most favorable to the employee computed
by dividing by thirteen the wages, not including overtime
or premium pay, of the employee earned through that
employer in the first, second, third, or fourth period of
thirteen consecutive calendar weeks in the 52 weeks
immediately preceding the injury.
Applying the foregoing statute to the facts of this case, I
find that the applicant did not quite work the full 13 weeks of the
first quarter of 1992. Rather, she worked 10 weeks in that quarter
beginning with the payroll period ending January 26, 1992 and
ending halfway through the payroll period ending April 5, 1992.
Adding the gross wages received by the applicant beginning with the
$113.43 payment for the period ending 1/26/92 and ending with onehalf (1/2) of the $208.67 payment (i.e. $104.34) for the period
ending 4/5/92, results in total wages to the applicant of
$1,618.55. Dividing the total wages by 10 weeks results in an
average weekly wage of $161.85 per week, which entitles the
applicant to compensation benefits of $108 per week, when rounded
to the nearest whole dollar.
Based on the findings of the Panel the applicant is entitled
to temporary total compensation for the period May 7, 1992 through
July 15, 1992, or a total of 10 weeks at the rate of $108 per week
for a total of $1,080. The applicant is also entitled to 6.24
weeks of permanent impairment benefits at the rate of $108 per week
for a total of $673.92 for her 2% impairment due to the industrial
accident.
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CONCLUSION OF LAW:
Jessica Jacobsen sustained a compensable industrial accident
on May 6, 1992 while employed by Hilton Hotel, and is entitled to
benefits therefor.

ORDER:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Hilton Hotel and/or United
Pacific Reliance pay Jessica Jacobsen compensation at the rate of
$108 per week for 10 weeks for a total of $1,080, for temporary
total disabilty resulting from the industrial accident of May 6,
1992. These benefits shall be paid in a lump sum with 8% interest
from July 16, 1992.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Hilton Hotel and/or United Pacific
Reliance pay Jessica Jacobsen compensation at the rate of $108 per
week for 6.24 weeks for a total of $673.92, for the 2% permanent
impairment resulting from the industrial accident of May 6, 1992.
These benefits shall be paid in a lump sum with 8% interest from
July 16, 1992.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that that Hilton Hotel and/or United
Pacific Reliance pay M. David Eckersley, attorney for applicant,
the sum of $351 plus 20% of the interest awarded to the applicant,
for services rendered in this matter. Said fee to be deducted from
the award herein and remitted directly to counsel's office.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Hilton Hotel and/or United Pacific
Reliance pay all medical expenses incurred as the result of the
industrial accident of May 6, 1992.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in.writing within-.thirty (30) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is
timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the
date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a written
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-46b12(2), Utah Code Annotated.
DATED this 4th day of February, 1994.

Timothy Or. Allen
Presiding Administrative Law Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that on February 4, 1994, a copy of the
attached Order in the case of Jessica Jacobsen was mailed to the
following persons at the following addresses, postage prepaid:
M. David Eckersley, Atty., 175 E. 400 S., #900, SLC, UT 84111
Stuart Poelman, Atty., P O Box 45000, SLC, UT 84145-5000
Jessica Jacobsen, 2144 S. Highland Dr., #150-154, SLC, UT 84106
United Pacific Reliance Insurance, Vickie Holland,
P O Box 526198, SLC, UT 84152-6198

BY DIRECTION:
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By

^Jv^^ U-&JU^>~>/

Tim A l l e n / ^ ^

ADDENDUM B:
ORDER ON MOTION FOR REVIEW

?-'/-*/
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
JESSICA D. JACOBSEN,

*
*

Applicant,
VS.

*
*
*

ORDER ON MOTION
FOR REVIEW

*

HILTON HOTEL and
PACIFIC RELIANCE INSURANCE,

*
*

Case No. 92-0817

*

Defendants.

*
*

Hilton Hotel and its insurance carrier, Pacific Reliance
(referred to jointly as "Hilton" hereafter) asks The Industrial
Commission of Utah to review the Administrative Law Judge's
decision awarding workers' compensation benefits to Jessica D.
Jacobsen.
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over
these Motions For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12,
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-82.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission generally adopts the findings of fact set forth
in the ALJ's decision, except to the extent such findings are
amplified or corrected below.
Ms. Jacobsen began working as a waitress for Hilton during
January 1992. During the course of each shift, she was frequently
required to lift trays filled with dishes and meals. On April 19,
1992, as she was lifting a heavy tub of dishes, she experienced
pain in her back. She. continued to work. On May 6, 1992, as she
was lifting a tray with meals to her shoulder, she experienced pain
in her back, neck and left hand.
Ms. Jacobsen was examined by a physician who referred her to
physical therapy. She returned to work in mid-July, 1992. After
one month, she again began to experience neck pain in connection
with lifting. During late August 1992, she resigned because she
could not perform her work duties.
Ms. Jacobsen has been examined by a medical panel appointed by
the ALJ. The panel concluded that she suffered a 6% whole person
impairment due to problems associated with her cervical spine. Two
thirds of that impairment preexisted her work at Hilton and one
third resulted from her work at Hilton.
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Ms. Jacobsen was also examined by Dr. Schricker on behalf of
Hilton. Dr. Schricker concluded: "There is no question that her
work activities or (sic) early May 1992 resulted in an aggravation
of her well-documented pre-existing condition of osteoarthritis."
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The ALJ concluded that Ms. Jacobsen did not suffer from
preexisting neck problems prior to May 6, 1992. In its Motion For
Review, Hilton disputes the ALJ's conclusion and argues that Ms.
Jacobsen suffered
from a preexisting neck condition that
contributed to the problems she experienced while working at
Hilton. According to Hilton's argument, since Ms. Jacobsen had a
preexisting injury, she must meet the "legal causation" test of
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 770 P.2d 912 (Utah 1988).
Based upon the reports of the medical panel and Dr. Schricker,
it appears that Hilton is correct in its argument that Ms. Jacobsen
suffered from a preexisting osteoarthritis condition in her neck.
Therefore, under Allen, ibid., she must demonstrate that her
"cumulative work-related exertion exceeds the normal level of
exertion in nonemployment life." Nvrehn v. Industrial Commission,
800 P.2d 330 (Utah 1990).
After considering the demands of Ms. Jacobsen's employment,
the Commission concludes that the requirements of her work, and in
particular the repetitious lifting of loaded serving trays, exceeds
the normal
level
of
exertion
customarily
experienced
in
nonemployment life.
Consequently, even though Ms. Jacobsen
suffered from a preexisting condition, she has satisfied the Allen
requirement of legal causation and is entitled to the workers'
compensation benefits awarded by the ALJ.
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Commission denies the Hilton
Hotel's Motion for Review. The Commission affirms the award of
benefits as set forth in the ALJ's decision. It is so ordered.
Dated this /^ L

day of September, 1994.

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by
filing a request for reconsideration with the Commission within 20
days of the date of this Order.
Alternatively, any party may
appeal this Order by filing a Petition For Review with the Court of
Appeals within 30 days of the date of this Order.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON
MOTIONS FOR REVIEW in the case of Jessica D. Jacobsen v. Hilton
Hotel and Pacific Reliance Insurance,. Case No. 92-0817, was mailed,
first class postage prepaid, this /-fe/.day of September, 1994 to the
following:
M. DAVID ECKERSLEY
ATTORNEY AT LAW
175 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 900
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
STUART POELMAN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P. 0. BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5000
VICKIE HOLLAND
UNITED PACIFIC RELIANCE INSURANCE
P. O. BOX 526298
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84152-6198

I
Diane Kearns v
Secretary to General Counsel
Industrial Commission of Utah
H:\AH\92-08170

